VOLUME IV, CHAPTER 14, SECTION 1
An Objective Account of China's Institutions, Clearing Away Five Simplifications
The last chapter put democracy back inside the frame of enfeoffment. This section opens out one of the most disputed concrete issues in the world today, the understanding of China's institutions. China is discussed on its own not because China is special, but because the gap today between the world's discourse construction about China's institutions and how they actually run is one of the widest gulfs in present-day political understanding, and if this gulf is not resolved, humankind's whole understanding of centralized authority, of democracy, and of the diversity of political institutions will be distorted.
One. Why this section discusses China on its own
This book already opened out China's institutions in depth in the section on China: democratic centralism, collective leadership, multiparty cooperation plus political consultation, official selection mainly from the common people, the layered selection of seasoning across many provinces, able to improve continuously plus reduce inner drain, and having its own costs too. This section sets all of this firm as an independent proposition, sets it against the discourse of the great thinkers of five hundred years, and lets the reader see the gap between discourse construction and the actual institution.
It is discussed on its own because the existence of this gap distorts, along with it, people's understanding of the diversity of political institutions as a whole. If even the institution of a great country that has carried on for twenty-two hundred years and is running today can only be fitted with one or two labels, then the understanding of other institutions can hardly help being just as coarse. So what this section does is restore China's institutions out of the simplified labels, letting the reader see how they actually run, and as for whether they are good or not, the reader judges for themselves.
Two. Five simplifications of China in mainstream Western discourse
Mainstream Western discourse today describes China's institutions with roughly five simplifications. Simplification one, the one-party system or one-party autocracy, putting China under the same one-party label with several countries of different institutions, wholly overlooking that China has eight democratic parties taking part in state governance through the political consultative system. China is not a one-party system, it is a system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation led by the Communist Party. Simplification two, authoritarianism, putting China under the same authoritarian label with several countries of different institutions. This word is itself a discourse construction, putting every institution that is not Western-style liberal democracy into this one category, overlooking that China's democratic centralism has an inner decision-making mechanism, and that collective leadership is not one person deciding alone.
Simplification three, autocracy or dictatorship, describing China as something like an ancient autocratic monarch, overlooking that China has a complete system of constitution, legislative bodies, judicial bodies, and oversight bodies, and that a mechanism of collective decision differs in essence from one-man dictatorship. Simplification four, state capitalism, describing China as a state-controlled market economy, which catches some features in part, but overlooks that China's private economy is huge in scale and differs at the root from a planned economy. Simplification five, the China-threat thesis, describing China's rise as a threat to the Western-led order, overlooking that China is a cooperating party in many fields, the threat thesis as discourse serving particular political purposes. These five simplifications appear again and again, and added together they make up the whole framework of understanding of China's institutions in the Western context, but this framework departs considerably from the actual running.
Three. How these simplifications formed
This book analyzes honestly how these simplifications formed. Cause one, the historical and ideological context. The Cold War built the binary opposition of democratic countries against communist countries, and after the Cold War ended the discourse frame of democracy against authoritarianism was kept, China placed on the new opposite side. This is the continuation of a discourse frame, not new research on the actual institution. In the decades since the Cold War ended China's institutions have changed enormously, but the discourse frame has basically not changed.
Cause two, barriers of language and culture. Most Western journalists, politicians, and scholars do not know Chinese and can only rely on second-hand translation, China's political culture and system of concepts differ considerably from the West's, and simple translation often loses the original meaning, these barriers making understanding often rest on simplified labels rather than deep research. Cause three, the needs of political competition. In the competition between China and the West, simplified negative descriptions serve particular political purposes, describing China as authoritarian makes Western democracy look superior, describing China as a threat unites consensus inside the West. These descriptions are not all deliberate rumor, but their formation is indeed closely tied to the needs of political competition. Cause four, there is honest research too. In recent years many serious Western scholars have also done deep research on China's institutions, providing an important resource for understanding China's actual institutions, but this research has far less influence in mainstream discourse than the simplified labels, the force of discourse construction often overpowering serious research.
Four. Seven objective restorations of China's institutions
All the propositions set firm in the section on China are presented again in full, as the objective restoration of China's institutions. The first restoration, democratic centralism. The democratic end is full discussion before a decision, the centralized end is the whole party carrying it out after a decision, the two ends together avoiding endless discussion and also avoiding one person deciding alone, this being a different political principle. The second restoration, collective leadership plus standing-committee members managing different fronts. The highest decision-making body is made up of several standing-committee members managing different fronts, major decisions discussed and passed collectively, not decided by one person alone, in a sense more power-dividing and more consultative than many institutions where the president decides alone.
The third restoration, multiparty cooperation plus political consultation. China does not have only one political party, the eight democratic parties are not opposition parties but participating parties, governing together with the Communist Party, their members holding important posts, a political form wholly different from a one-party system. The fourth restoration, official selection mainly from the common people, through the civil-service exam plus grassroots promotion plus intra-party cultivation plus comprehensive assessment, most of them from ordinary families rather than political dynasties, in sharp contrast with the long dominance of political dynasties in many Western countries. The fifth restoration, the layered selection of seasoning across many provinces. A person entering the highest layer generally must have served as the main head in several different provinces, this being another layer of enfeoffment, a small-range examination-style selection of the worthy. The sixth restoration, able to improve continuously plus reduce inner drain. Over the decades of reform and opening the institution has kept evolving and adjusting, avoiding rigidity, and the party has a mechanism of self-reflection and adjustment. The seventh restoration, it has its own costs too. Voices of inner opposition are hard to express in an institutionalized way, the space for criticism and questioning is limited, media oversight is relatively limited, the mechanism for correcting a decision error is relatively slow. These costs are real, but they are a wholly different thing from simplified labels like autocracy and dictatorship.
Five. The picture seen after the objective restoration
Put the seven restorations together, and here is the actual picture of China's institutions today. First, China's institution is a multiple mix of democratic centralism plus collective leadership plus multiparty cooperation plus commoner selection plus seasoning across many provinces, the deepest present-day sample of centralized authority today. Second, it carries on the twenty-two-hundred-year tradition of centralized authority while blending in many elements of modern political institutions, forming a governing system with Chinese features. Third, being able to improve continuously plus reduce inner drain is what is distinctive about it, and at the same time it has its own costs too.
Fourth, a true one-party autocracy plus family heredity is one party in power plus no other legal party plus family heredity across several generations plus no true collective leadership, and putting China under the same label as this institution is a simplifying error of discourse. Fifth, China's institution is not simple authoritarianism, autocracy, or dictatorship. These labels cannot sum up how it actually runs, and cannot explain why it can show a distinctive governing effectiveness today. This book is honest, this restoration is not saying China's institution is better than the West's, it is saying to restore China's institution out of the simplified labels and let the reader see how it actually runs, and as for whether this institution is good or not, the reader judges by their own position and values, rather than being led by the nose by simplified labels.
Six. The position this section sets
This section sets firm the thirty-third layer. Mainstream Western discourse today has five simplifications of China, the one-party system, authoritarianism, autocracy, state capitalism, and the China-threat thesis, and these simplifications depart considerably from how the institution actually runs. This book presents the seven restorations again, clearing away the simplifications of Western discourse, so that the world has a more accurate understanding of China's institutions. A true one-party autocracy plus family heredity is wholly different from China and Vietnam, and this book should distinguish them objectively rather than use a single label.
The real thing for the reader is four points. First, what you hear, that China is a one-party system, is it accurate? What you hear, that China is an authoritarian state, is it factual analysis or discourse construction? Second, the actual running of any institution is more complex than one or two simplified labels, and seeing clearly the gap between discourse construction and the actual institution is one of the most important abilities of understanding for the reader today. Third, this line of thought of objective restoration applies to the study of every country's institutions, not only China's. America's institution is not only the beacon of democracy and liberty, it also has the inner tensions this book stated objectively in the section on America, and any country's institution needs to be seen both for what is real in it and for its inner costs, rather than being led by the nose by either side's discourse construction. Fourth, this posture of objective restoration is the root posture of this book, taking no stand, presenting the facts, passing no verdict, letting the reader judge for themselves, striving on every concrete issue to separate discourse from fact, and this section only stresses it once more, on the issue of China's institutions. The next section covers centralized authority across domains, and this book's method of laying out both sides. See you in the next section.
Credit to the ancestors; the mistakes are mine: Tiger Lyon.
Section Two. Centralized authority across domains, and the method of laying out both sides