VOLUME IV, CHAPTER 14, SECTION 1
An Objective Account of China's Institutions, Clearing Away Five Simplifications
The last chapter compared the core claims, put forward an independent claim, and returned democracy to structure. This chapter enters the close of the whole Part and the whole volume. This section does one concrete thing, giving China's political institution an objective account. This book has stated many times that it lays out both sides and passes no verdict, and this section is a concrete practice of that posture, clearing away the several simplified labels laid on China's institution by mainstream Western discourse, and this same clearing applies equally to the study of the United States and of any country.
Choosing China as the object of this section is not because this book stands with China, it is because China's institution is the sample most heavily simplified in mainstream Western discourse today, and returning its actual running is the best practice of the posture of laying out both sides. Mainstream Western discourse has several common simplified labels for China's institution, and this section clears them one by one, not to argue that China's institution is good, but to argue that these simplifications do not match the actual running, letting the reader see the fuller face for themselves and judge.
The first simplification, the one-party system. Mainstream Western discourse commonly describes China as a one-party system, but this label misses much of the actual structure. As covered in the section on China, besides the Chinese Communist Party, China has eight democratic parties, taking part in governance through the political consultative conference, their members holding important posts at every level, participating parties rather than opposition parties. And the standing committee at the core of decision is collective leadership, several members managing different fronts and deciding major matters collectively, not one person deciding alone. And official selection is mainly from the common people, through the civil-service exam plus grassroots promotion plus seasoning across many provinces, layer by layer of selection. To describe such a structure simply as a one-party system misses the multiparty cooperation, the collective leadership, and the commoner selection. This book does not argue whether this structure is good, it argues that the one-party-system label does not match the actual running.
The second simplification, authoritarianism. Mainstream Western discourse commonly labels China authoritarian, but this word carries a strong value judgment, meaning a government controlling society by force plus suppressing freedom. This word cannot explain several facts. It cannot explain the great space China's market economy gives to individual economic activity, hundreds of millions doing business and choosing employment freely. It cannot explain the great scale of Chinese people's movement, tourism, study, and consumption. It cannot explain the vitality of Chinese society on the internet, in popular culture, and in daily life. It cannot explain how China lifted several hundred million people out of poverty in a few decades, an achievement hard to reach by suppression. This book does not argue that China has no problem in the control of speech and society, these being facts, but the single label authoritarian cannot cover the full picture of China's institution and society. Laying out both sides means seeing both the part of control and the part of vitality, not covering everything with one word.
The third simplification, autocracy or despotism. Mainstream Western discourse sometimes uses autocracy or despotism to describe China, but as covered in the section on China, China's highest decision is collective leadership, not one-man decision, its official selection commoner-based and merit-selecting, not decided by family and the core circle, its policy formed through intra-party consultation plus expert argument plus pilot trials plus gradual rollout, not one-man dictate. This book distinguished earlier a true one-party autocracy plus family heredity, its features one party in power with no other in substantial participation, family hereditary leadership, no true collective leadership, no true political consultation, official selection mainly by family and the core circle. Setting China against this standard, China's institution does not fit the strict sense of autocracy or despotism. This book does not argue that China's institution has no room to concentrate power, that is a feature, but autocracy or despotism as a label does not match the actual running.
The fourth simplification, state capitalism. Mainstream Western discourse commonly describes China's economy as state capitalism, meaning the state controls the economic lifelines plus intervenes in the market. This label misses the actual structure of China's economy too. China's private economy contributes over half the tax, over sixty percent of the output, over seventy percent of technical innovation, and over eighty percent of urban employment, a scale of the private economy hard to cover with state capitalism. This book does not argue whether China's economic model is good, the specific relation of government and market being the field of the volume on economic institutions, it argues only that the state-capitalism label misses the great scale and vitality of the private economy. The fifth simplification, the China threat. Mainstream Western discourse in recent years commonly frames China as a threat, holding that China's rise threatens the existing world order. This framing is a geopolitical judgment, not an objective description of an institution. This book passes no verdict on the specific issues of international relations, it points out only that the China-threat framing is a strategic judgment carrying a standpoint, not an objective account of how China's institution runs, and to mix this framing into the study of China's institution turns the objective study of an institution into a tool of geopolitics. This book returns the study of China's institution to the objective analysis of the institution itself, setting aside the geopolitical judgment.
Having cleared the five simplifications, this book states positively the objective account of China's institution, the seven restorations. First, restore it as one of the deepest present-day samples of centralized authority, carrying on the twenty-two-hundred-year tradition and modernized. Second, restore its actual structure of democratic centralism plus collective leadership plus multiparty cooperation, not a simple one-party system. Third, restore its selection mechanism of commoner officials plus seasoning across many provinces, the political elite gaining real governing experience of several regions and different situations. Fourth, restore its feature of high decision efficiency plus long-term strategic consistency, able to do large-scale long-term works. Fifth, restore its ability to improve continuously plus reduce inner drain, a major decision once made able to be executed systematically. Sixth, restore its real costs too, limited institutionalized expression of inner opposition, limited space for criticism and questioning, limited media oversight, a relatively slow mechanism for correcting decision error, the stability of leadership transition depending on intra-party rules. Seventh, restore the whole picture, an institution of both distinctive strengths and real costs, an institution still evolving, its future to be watched. These seven restorations are the concrete practice of laying out both sides, both the strengths and the costs, both the achievements and the problems, no verdict of good or bad reached, the fuller picture presented, the reader judging.
Set firm an important point: this posture of restoration applies equally to the study of the United States and of any country. In the section on America this book restored the deep wisdom of America's institution and its real costs together, and that is the same posture. Facing any country, this book does the same thing, clearing away the simplified label, restoring the actual running, laying out both sides, reaching no verdict. Facing China, clear away the simplifications of mainstream Western discourse. Facing America, clear away the idealized self-positioning. Facing any country, clear away the label plus restore the actuality plus lay out both sides. This is the consistent posture of this book, not standing with any country, standing only with objective restoration and laying out both sides. The reason for choosing China as the concrete sample of this section is only that China's institution is the most heavily simplified today and most needs restoring, not that this book stands with China.
So here is the position this section lays down. Clear away the five simplifications laid on China's institution by mainstream Western discourse, the one-party system, authoritarianism, autocracy, state capitalism, and the China threat, not to argue that China's institution is good, but to argue that these simplifications do not match the actual running. Restore China's institution objectively, the seven restorations, both its distinctive strengths and its real costs, reaching no verdict of good or bad, presenting the fuller picture, the reader judging. This posture applies equally to the study of the United States and of any country, clearing away the label plus restoring the actuality plus laying out both sides being the consistent posture of this book. The real thing for the reader is several questions to think through for themselves. When you form an impression of some country, is that impression from an objective restoration, or from a simplified label? How many of your impressions of China, of America, of other countries come from a real understanding, and how many from a media-given label? Are you willing, facing any country, to set aside the ready-made label and try to understand its actual running for yourself? This ability to lay out both sides plus clear away the label plus restore the actuality is the most important thinking ability this book hopes to give the reader, an ability usable not only on the study of a country but on the study of any person and any thing. The next section covers the two most important things of this book together, cross-domain centralized authority as a tool for seeing the world, and laying out both sides as a posture for writing about the world.
Credit to the ancestors; the mistakes are mine: Tiger Lyon.