VOLUME IV, CHAPTER 10, SECTION 1
China, an Objective Account of Democratic Centralism
Last chapter covered the coming and the ultimate goal of centralized authority, and that today's centralized authority long ceased to be the old imperial one-man dictatorship. This chapter looks at two of the most representative present-day samples, one China and one the United States. This section covers China first. It is covered on its own because this institution has long been heavily simplified and misread in mainstream Western discourse, and what this book does is not to accept any side's label, but to describe objectively how it actually runs, letting the reader judge.
Today's centralized authority has developed many modern forms, one of which has long been heavily simplified in mainstream Western discourse. Many Western textbooks, media, and political commentary describe China as a one-party system, authoritarianism, an autocratic state. This description is not accurate and departs considerably from China's actual political structure. What this book does is not to accept any side's label, but to describe objectively how China's political institution actually runs, letting the reader judge. And China's political institution is one of the deepest present-day samples of centralized authority. China carried on a twenty-two-hundred-year tradition of centralized authority, and in the twenty-first century became through this institution the world's second-largest economy, its high-speed rail, poverty alleviation, epidemic response, and infrastructure building, great works on a large scale, showing the present-day effectiveness of centralized authority. Understanding China's political institution is one of the keys to understanding the present-day form of centralized authority, so this section covers China on its own.
The core of China's political institution is democratic centralism. This is the core organizing principle of the Chinese Communist Party, extended also to the running of the whole political institution. The concept was put forward by Lenin in the early twentieth century, and later, joined in China with China's traditional political wisdom, evolved into a political structure with Chinese features. Democratic centralism has two ends. The democratic end is full discussion before a decision, party members at every level expressing views, major questions taken to meetings for discussion, the leading bodies at every level produced through election, different views fully expressed before a decision. The centralized end is that after a decision is made the whole party carries it out, the lower obeying the higher, the individual obeying the organization, the minority obeying the majority, the whole party obeying the center, and once a decision is made the whole party acts as one. The key to democratic centralism is not either end, it is the dialectical balance of the two ends. Democracy alone falls into endless discussion and decision paralysis. Centralism alone becomes one person deciding alone, unable to correct after an error. The two ends together avoid both extremes, the root principle of how China's political institution runs. It is not a simple stacking of democracy plus centralized authority, it is an organic, dynamic running mechanism, both consulting fully before a decision and executing as one after it, one of China's present-day contributions to world political wisdom, and different in political principle from the simplified Western understanding of democracy as multiparty election.
One concrete form in which democratic centralism lands is collective leadership. The highest decision-making body is the standing committee of the political bureau of the party's central committee, made up of several members, each managing a different front. One presides over the highest coordination of the party, the state, and the army. One presides over the daily administration of the central government and the management of the economy and society. One presides over the highest legislative body. One presides over the political consultative body, the core platform of multiparty cooperation, where the democratic parties, people from every field, and representatives of every ethnic group consult on the great affairs of state. One presides over intra-party oversight and supervision. One presides over political and legal work, coordinating the systems of public security, procuratorate, courts, justice, and state security. One presides over the daily party affairs, coordinating the central ministries. These fronts together cover all the core governing functions of a modern state. Each front is managed by one standing-committee member, and major decisions are discussed and passed collectively by the standing committee. The key to collective leadership is not each deciding independently, it is managing different fronts but deciding collectively through the standing committee, major matters needing consensus or a majority, avoiding one person deciding alone. So China is not a political institution of one-man dictatorship, it is collective leadership plus the management of different fronts plus the collective decision of major matters. This collective leadership is, in a sense, more power-dividing and more consultative than the institution of many Western countries where the president decides alone.
Set firm an important fact: China does not have only one political party. Besides the Chinese Communist Party there are eight democratic parties, each with a different membership, such as former Nationalist figures, the cultural and educational field, the economic field, the medical and health field, returned overseas Chinese, the science and technology field, and people of Taiwan origin. The feature of these eight democratic parties is that they are not opposition parties but participating parties, taking part together with the Chinese Communist Party in governing the state, expressing views on major state decisions through channels like the political consultative conference, their members holding important posts at every level, including minister, vice chairman of the consultative conference, and vice chairman of the standing committee of the legislature, with important influence in professional fields like science, education, culture, and health. This institution is called the system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation led by the Chinese Communist Party, one of China's basic political institutions, different from the Western model of two or many parties competing and taking turns in power, and different too from a true one-party system. The Chinese Communist Party is the leading party but not the only party. The democratic parties are participating parties, not opposition parties, but also not appendages. Between the two is a relation of cooperation plus consultation plus joint governance. So to describe China simply as a one-party system or a one-party autocracy is a simplification and misreading of China's political institution by mainstream Western discourse, and this book should describe objectively China's actual system of multiparty cooperation, letting the reader judge the features and effectiveness of this institution.
Another deep feature of China's political institution is that official selection is mainly from the common people. Through channels like the civil-service exam, promotion from the grassroots, and intra-party cultivation, a great number of officials are selected, and most of these officials are of ordinary family, not of a political dynasty or an elite family. This contrasts with many Western countries, some of which have long-active political families, some of which have many leaders coming from elite preparatory schools and top universities, forming an alumni elite circle. China's official selection passes several gates. The first, the civil-service exam, with over two million taking the exams at every level each year, the admission rate very low, the competition extremely fierce, the present-day examination covered in the earlier chapter on the examination. The second, promotion from the grassroots, after entering the civil service through the exam starting from a grassroots post, and through several years to more than a dozen of grassroots experience and assessment, gradually promoted. The third, intra-party cultivation, the party's organization departments systematically cultivating cadres, including rotation, training, and inspection. The fourth, comprehensive assessment, promotion decided by multidimensional assessment of governing record, popular evaluation, character, and ability. This selection mechanism secures a close connection between the official corps and grassroots society, the officials mostly of ordinary family, understanding the life and needs of ordinary people, seasoned through years at the grassroots, familiar with local realities. This selection has its own problems too, such as the exam becoming over-oriented to test-taking and local corruption, but on the whole, commoner official selection is one of the core features of China's political institution, contrasting with the Western tradition of political dynasties.
Open out another deep feature of China's political institution, the layered selection of seasoning across many provinces, which is also a present-day extension of the enfeoffment of centralized authority, a small-range examination-style selection of the worthy. China's political institution has an unwritten but extremely strict rule, that a person entering the highest decision-making layer generally must have served as the main head in two or three different provincial-level regions, these provinces usually spread across different areas, east, center, west, and border, covering different levels of development and different governing challenges, each province governed for generally a few years, so that a candidate's time governing on the ground can reach six to fifteen years. Scholars have confirmed by study that for civilian leaders the experience of serving as a provincial head has almost become a precondition for entering the highest layer. Behind this rule is a deep logic. First, avoiding ivory-tower decision-making, that through governing several provinces a leader has personally handled the real problems of economy, society, ethnicity, environment, industry, foreign trade, poverty relief, education, medicine, public security, and disaster response. Second, covering different governing challenges, China being vast, the governing challenge of each region wholly different, so requiring a leader to govern in different regions secures his firsthand understanding of the realities of different regions. Third, layered selection and survival of the fitter, a cadre starting from the grassroots and passing county, city, and province, at each level assessed, promoted, and evaluated, only the one who makes real achievements at each level continuing upward. Fourth, the accumulation of real experience, governing in several provinces accumulating decision-making experience across different situations, forming a full understanding of China's actual governance. This rule is at bottom the combination of a present-day extension of the enfeoffment of the institutions of enfeoffment plus the merit-selection spirit of the examination. Recall the chapter on the examination, where the long-lived dynasties quietly used an internal examination among the princes in succession to the throne, picking the most fitting from all possible heirs. Today China's highest-layer selection is of one line with this historical law, only the range enlarged, no longer selecting from among princes but from among tens of millions of party members across the country, through decades of layered selection, picking the most fitting person. From grassroots enfeoffment up to county, city, province, and many provinces, enfeoffed up layer by layer, each layer passing assessment, approval, and appointment, an extremely strict, extremely long layered enfeoffment plus layered examination. This mechanism of seasoning across many provinces plus layered selection contrasts with the selection of the political elite in the West. It is not to say the Western institution is bad, it is to say that the two institutions have different answers to what experience the political elite should have. China's institution answers that a leader should have the real governing experience of several regions and different situations. The Western institution answers that a leader should have a base of popular support plus political talent plus intra-party backing, proving through campaign that he can represent the voters. The two answers each have their logic and each their cost.
Put these several aspects together, and China's political institution today has several deep features. A mix of multiple institutions, centralized authority plus democratic centralism plus collective leadership plus multiparty cooperation plus commoner selection plus seasoning across many provinces, of one line with the First Emperor's centralized authority of twenty-two hundred years ago but modernized in concrete form. High decision efficiency plus long-term strategic consistency, continuous leadership letting the state strategy hold consistent across decades, able to do large-scale long-term works. Concentrating strength to do great things, completing large-scale high-speed rail building, the great development of the west, precise poverty alleviation, epidemic response, several great works. China's political institution is not rigid, it is dynamically evolving, and since reform and opening the economic, social, and political institutions have all been adjusting continuously, every major adjustment carried through by intra-party reflection, consultation, and decision. China's institution can be moved, a major decision once made able to be executed systematically, not hollowed out again and again, and not reversed again and again by a change of party, and this ability to improve is the core of a governing system, its other side a great reduction of political inner drain. But set the other side, China's institution has its own cost too. Voices of inner opposition are hard to express in an institutionalized way, the space for criticism and questioning limited, media oversight relatively limited, the mechanism for correcting a decision error relatively slow, needing to wait for inner reflection to adjust, the stability of leadership transition depending on intra-party rules rather than election, the test of institutional stability being a long-term one. This book passes no verdict on the merit of these features, only states objectively how China's political institution actually runs and its advantages and its costs, letting the reader judge by their own position and values.
To distinguish China's democratic centralism plus multiparty cooperation plus collective leadership from a true one-party autocracy plus family heredity, the clearest way is to find a contrast sample. A true one-party autocracy plus family heredity has these features: one party in power, no other party in substantial participation, the nominal satellite parties wholly obedient with no independent political influence. Family hereditary leadership, passing several generations, this being family heredity in the true sense. No true collective leadership, the highest power of decision highly concentrated in one person's hand. No true political consultation, other political forces with no channel of substantial participation in decisions. Official selection mainly by family and the core circle, origin and background having a decisive influence on a career. This is a true one-party autocracy plus family heredity, with a root difference from China's political institution. So one cannot lump different countries under the same one-party-system label. Some are democratic centralism plus collective leadership plus multiparty cooperation plus commoner selection plus seasoning across many provinces, some are democratic centralism plus collective leadership, and only some are a true one-party autocracy plus family heredity, these being wholly different political institutions, only the last fitting the strict sense of a one-party autocracy. This book should distinguish these different political institutions objectively, rather than using a single simplified label. This section is this book's preliminary account of China's present-day political institution, and many deep claims need further opening out, such as how China's institution will keep evolving in future, how it will meet the new challenges of globalization and modernization, and what it offers other developing countries, questions this section does not open out, leaving them to the reader to think through. The purpose of this book is not to give the answer to every question, it is to present the regularity and the phenomenon to the reader, letting the reader see, think, and judge for themselves.
So here is the position this section lays down. We set firm this layer: China's political institution today is democratic centralism plus collective leadership plus multiparty cooperation plus commoner official selection plus the layered selection of seasoning across many provinces, a mix of multiple institutions, one of the deepest present-day samples of centralized authority. Democratic centralism plus collective leadership plus multiparty cooperation, this structure differs from the one-party system simplified in Western discourse. Commoner-based official selection plus seasoning across many provinces secures a close connection of the governing system with grassroots society and gives the political elite real governing experience of several regions and different situations, a deep feature of China's governing system, contrasting with the tradition of political dynasties in many Western countries. Able to improve continuously plus reduce inner drain is a feature China's institution shows, but it has its cost too. This book passes no verdict on which is better, only distinguishes different political institutions objectively, letting the reader judge by their own position and values.
Having covered China, the next section covers another most representative present-day sample, the United States. Setting the two most different present-day political institutions together, describing both objectively, laying out both sides for both, we see clearly how America's democratic election plus federal division of powers runs, and see its advantages and its costs too. Let the two institutions stand side by side, and the reader compare and judge for themselves.
Credit to the ancestors; the mistakes are mine: Tiger Lyon.