VOLUME IV, CHAPTER 10, SECTION 3
Why Centralized Authority Fails
The last two sections covered China and the United States, two present-day samples. Reading this far you may have formed an impression, that centralized authority always wins, is always effective, is always good. This impression is not accurate. This section sets the other side: centralized authority also fails, also has its moments of collapse, also has situations it cannot meet. Understanding these failures is truly understanding centralized authority.
The earlier sections covered why centralized authority must win, expansion, Europe eighteen hundred years late, and the two deep samples of China and America, but this book must set the other side, the failure of centralized authority. Let the reader see that centralized authority is not all-powerful, that it has inner conditions, inner problems, and inner risks, and understanding these conditions, problems, and risks is truly understanding centralized authority. And the failures of centralized authority in history are often not because the principle of centralized authority is wrong, but because some key condition in the running failed, plus some inner problem accumulated to a critical point, plus some outside shock arrived at the same time. Understanding these failures is so that today's centralized authority runs more steadily, longer, and better. This section looks at several of the most representative failures and the inner law behind them.
The late Roman Empire is the first major failure. The Roman Empire was once the centralized great state of the Mediterranean world, lasting some five hundred years, its territory at its height covering the whole Mediterranean rim, one of the strongest political bodies of its day. But in the late Roman Empire the centralized authority failed step by step, and in the end the Western Roman Empire fell. Why did it fail? First, the collapse of the succession institution, Rome never building a stable succession, most of the time the army raising up a man, whoever the army backed being emperor, and in the crisis of the third century some twenty-five emperors changed in fifty years, the great majority dying by violence, the succession unstable and the center in disorder. Second, the collapse of the fiscal system, Roman finance long depending on the spoils of campaign plus provincial taxes, and after expansion reached its limit the campaign income fell, the border-defense spending grew, the currency debased and prices soared, the center losing the material base to keep the army and the bureaucracy. Third, the privatization of the army, the Roman army gradually evolving from a state army into the private armies of generals, the garrisons of each region loyal to their own general rather than to the emperor, giving generals the capital to challenge the emperor. Fourth, a large-scale entry of outside peoples plus inner division happening at once, outer pressure plus inner division arriving together, the resources of the centralized authority scattered, unable to respond, and the Western Roman Empire formally fell. Rome's failure left deep lessons: without a stable succession institution, a centralized great state can hardly last, fiscal collapse is deadlier than military defeat, Rome not shattered by one war but slowly dragged down by centuries of fiscal problems, the privatization of the army is a deadly threat, a lesson that shaped the later ages and especially the Song, and an outside shock plus inner division arriving at once, which any centralized authority can hardly meet.
The middle and late Tang is another sample, the warlord fragmentation. The Tang was another brilliant sample of the centralized great state, the Zhenguan rule and the Kaiyuan height of the early Tang showing the flourishing of all three present, centralized authority plus the will of the people plus the enlightened ruler. But in the middle and late Tang, after the An Lushan rebellion, the centralized authority failed step by step. Why did it fail? First, the loss of control of the military-governor system, Emperor Xuanzong setting up military governors to strengthen border defense, giving the border military-administrative heads concentrated power, the intent to make border defense more effective, the actual effect that the military governor became a little emperor in his own region, holding the three great powers of army, finance, and administration, in the end raising troops in revolt, the An Lushan rebellion breaking out, and the Tang turning from height to decline. Second, the continuation of warlord fragmentation, after the An Lushan rebellion was put down, to end the war fast the court let the surrendered rebel commanders keep their territory and troops, and for the hundred fifty years after the Tang center basically could not control many of the warlords, the centralized authority still there in form but already hollowed out in fact. Third, eunuch domination plus court infighting, the eunuch bloc holding the palace guard, manipulating succession, and interfering in state affairs, the court ministers splitting into factions, the factional strife fierce, the emperor unable to reconcile them. Fourth, a peasant rising plus the final collapse, a peasant rising sweeping half of China took Chang'an, the Tang center already unable to respond, able only to rely on warlord troops to put it down, further strengthening the warlords, and in the end a warlord deposed the last Tang emperor, and China entered the divided period of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms. The lesson of the Tang's failure directly shaped the Song, which after founding took all military and local power back to the center through measures like releasing the generals' military power over a cup of wine, avoiding the warlord problem, but paying the cost of military weakening in turn, two sides of an institutional choice.
The late Ming is another sample, factional strife plus fiscal collapse. The Ming was another centralized great state, lasting two hundred seventy-six years, going through a height and a gradual decline. Why did it fail? First, fierce factional strife, in the middle and late Ming the court ministers splitting into several factions, attacking and purging each other, many important policies overturned again and again, many able officials squeezed out, the centralized authority depending on unified decision, and factional strife making unified decision nearly impossible. Second, eunuch domination, the Ming one of the dynasties where eunuch power was greatest, great eunuchs holding the court, manipulating succession, holding the secret-police bodies, turning the centralized authority that should have been unified into the mutual grinding of several power-centers. Third, the collapse of the fiscal system, Ming finance long depending on fixed taxes and lacking adaptation to new economic forms, the commodity economy developing fast in the middle and late period but the taxes not keeping up, the fiscal deficit widening year by year, the border military spending high, the disaster relief often powerless. Fourth, Chongzhen's diligence speeding the collapse instead, Chongzhen a rare diligent emperor, a patch on his dragon robe, working ten hours and more a day, yet across seventeen years replacing more than fifty chief grand secretaries, the court affairs unable to be continuous, tolerating no differing view, dealing with many able officials, his suspicion and quick temper leaving subordinates afraid to offer true counsel, and in the end an inner rising plus an outer offensive happening at once, the Ming unable to respond. The lesson of the Ming's failure: factional strife is the greatest inner enemy of centralized authority, diligence is not the same as an enlightened ruler, Chongzhen not having the five abilities of the enlightened ruler covered in the section on the enlightened ruler, recognizing talent, daring to use, protecting, tolerating, and ceding the seat, having only the one side of diligence, and fiscal collapse plus factional strife plus inner and outer troubles arriving at once, of one line with the lesson of Rome.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union is the largest failure of centralized authority in the twentieth century. The Soviet Union was one of the most influential centralized-authority great states of the twentieth century, lasting some seventy years, once one of the two superpowers of the world, but in the end dissolving into fifteen independent countries, the largest failure of centralized authority in the twentieth century. Why did it fail? First, the long hardening of the economic system, the planned economy extremely efficient in the early stage of industrialization, letting the Soviet Union turn fast from an agricultural country into an industrial power, but later ever less able to adapt to complex economic activity, shortages of consumer goods becoming the norm, technical innovation falling behind the West, the economy sinking into long stagnation, the people's living standard far below the West, the deepest layer of discontent. Second, ideological hardening plus a closed discourse, long strict control of speech, thought, and culture, but information technology letting the people meet more and more outside information, the gap between the official account and what the people actually saw ever wider, the official discourse losing its power to persuade. Third, the accumulation of the ethnic problem, the Soviet Union a multi-ethnic federation, the ethnic consciousness of the constituent republics gradually awakening, the center long suppressing rather than resolving the ethnic problem, the pressure accumulating to a critical point. Fourth, the loss of control of the reform, the leadership pushing policies of restructuring and openness, the intent to restore the Soviet Union's vitality, but the way, speed, rhythm, and result of the reform exceeding what was expected, the economic reform bringing short-term chaos, the political reform stirring separatist forces, the long-suppressed discontent bursting at once, and in the end the Soviet Union dissolved. The lesson of the Soviet Union: the economic system must keep adapting to change, ideology cannot come loose from reality, the ethnic problem must be resolved rather than suppressed, and the way and rhythm of reform must be careful, the lesson of the Soviet Union not that it should not have reformed but that the way of reform lost control. Today China's reform and opening in some degree took the lesson of the Soviet Union, economic reform first plus political stability plus gradual advance, the adaptability of ideology plus pragmatism, ethnic regional autonomy plus support for economic development.
There are also some countries and regions today where centralized authority has failed and fallen into long chaos. This passage states as it is the fact of the failure of centralized authority in these regions, passing no verdict on the countries themselves, looking only at the structural phenomenon of the failure of centralized authority. Some countries, after the central government collapsed, went decades without a complete central government, splitting into regions controlled by several forces. Some countries, after the old regime fell, saw several governments coexist and several armed forces control different regions, society sinking into long chaos. Some countries, in long inner turmoil plus conflict among many factions, became a grave humanitarian crisis. The common lesson of these present-day samples: once centralized authority fails, a region falls at once into division, turmoil, poverty, and outside interference. Rebuilding centralized authority is harder than building it, possibly taking decades or even generations. The cost the people pay is extremely heavy, suffering unimaginable in peacetime becoming daily. This passage points at no concrete political judgment, only lets the reader see what the failure of centralized authority itself brings to the ordinary person of a place.
Put all the failures above together and you find several common laws. Law one, an unstable succession institution is the deepest inner threat to centralized authority, Rome, the Tang, the Ming, and the Soviet Union all facing the succession problem, and for a centralized great state to be long-lived it must have a stable mechanism for the transition of leaders. Law two, fiscal collapse is deadlier than military defeat, nearly every failure of centralized authority accompanied by the collapse of the fiscal system, finance the material base of centralized authority, and losing this base, no strong army and no clever official can save it. Law three, factional strife plus infighting plus factional contest is the inner enemy of centralized authority, the Tang, the Ming, and the Soviet Union all failing through inner division, and centralized authority must keep the unity of the decision-making layer. Law four, ideological hardening plus a closed discourse is deadly over the long run, ideology having to be able to adapt to change and tolerate differing inner voices, or in the end it loses the people's support. Law five, an outside shock plus inner problems arriving at once, any centralized authority can hardly meet, Rome, the Ming, and the Soviet Union all collapsing under the double pressure of outer plus inner. These laws give a deep warning to every centralized-authority state today: the succession institution must be stable, the fiscal system must have resilience, factional contest must be held in check, ideology must have give, and reform must have rhythm.
So here is the position this section lays down. We set firm this layer: centralized authority is not all-powerful, it fails too. The Roman Empire, the middle and late Tang, the late Ming, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and present-day failed samples are all samples of the failure of centralized authority. The common law of failure is an unstable succession institution, fiscal collapse, factional strife plus infighting, ideological hardening, and an outside shock plus inner problems arriving at once. The real things for the reader are four. First, the principle of centralized authority itself does not fail, what fails is the concrete conditions in the running, so facing a failure this book does not say centralized authority was wrong, but says some key condition in this running failed. Second, every centralized-authority state today must be alert to these five laws at all times, any one failing sending it toward failure. Third, rebuilding centralized authority is far harder than building it, and once it fails, rebuilding may take decades or even generations, so keeping the existing running and preventing failure matters more than any idealized rebuilding. Fourth, the country and organization the reader is in, family, enterprise, association, government, must face these laws too, any failure of centralized authority bringing similar chaos, and being alert to these risks in your own position is the deepest real thing this section gives the reader.
By here, the coming, the mechanisms, the ultimate goal, the present-day samples, and the laws of failure of centralized authority are all covered. But we have spoken all along of centralized authority at the level of the state. Centralized authority, as a life-level law, in fact runs through every organized group, from the enterprise to the family to the army to the association. The next chapter takes centralized authority beyond politics, to see how it runs in various groups, and brings the three root structures of political institutions together to see how they fit with each other.
Credit to the ancestors; the mistakes are mine: Tiger Lyon.